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AND
RESOLUTION OPTIONS
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results i.e. operational risk. These are
just a few of the risks banks face and

summarizes and concludes the paper.
2.O

MEANING AND SYMPTOMS
OF BANK DISTRESS

2.1

Meaning of Distress

quintessentially financial intermediation.

their complexities could be astounding.
lmproper management of these risks is
one sure cause of bank distress but this
is bank-specific, i.e. endogenous factor.
This is in addition to other bank specific
factors which also do cause distress.
Besides the fact that individual

ln this regard banks mobilise financial

bank's incompetence at managing

INTRODUCTION

A
A

meaninoful analvsis of causes of
Oant< distress and the options for
resolution would probably need to be
preceded by a brief discussion of the
role of banks in an economy. Bank's
role in any financial system is

resources from surplus economic

risks is a cause of bank distress, there

units for on lending to deficit units. ln

are also some exogenous factors
beyond banks' control that could
precipitate bank distress. These

mobilising deposits, banks issue
demandable claims in favour of the
surplus units. However, these savings

are pooled and extonded to deficit
units as illiquid loans and advances
with definite and invariably longer
maturity than the maturity of the
demandable debts. ln performing the

latter function, banks not only

include adverse developments in the
macroeconomy and policy reversals.
Furthermore, lapses in the regulatory/
supervisory framework as well as the
legal/judicial system also contribute to
the incidence of distress.
From the multiplicity of causes

of borrowing opportunities available to

and the complexity of the distress
phenomenon, it is apparent that its
resolution cannot be a one-sizejits-all

them using unique expertise as well
as continuously monitor and obtain

solution. Bank distress may be
localised or widespread among

repayment.
Obviously, by the very nature

depositories. For each scenario, a

of banking business, banks

undertake maturity transformation but

are also expected to screen the set

menu of options is available. This paper

are

examines the broad factors causing

inextricably involved in risk-taking. For

bank distress and the array of

instance, banks face the risk of not
being able to meet their obligations

resolution options. To this end the rest
of this paper is structured into 4 pafts.
Section 2 examines the meaning of
bank distress while Section 3 presents
detailed discussion of the main causes

to depositors to whom they have
issued demandable claims. This is
called liquidity risk. There is also the
likelihood of borrowers failing to repay
as agreed, i.e. risk of default or credit
risk. Similarly, there is the possibility

that the mechanism, processes and
controls employed by banks to carry
out its functions failto achieve desired

of bank distress as they relate to
Nigeria in particular. Section 4 provides
a review of the literature on resolution

options as well as an enumeration of
resolution options adopted to address

bank distress in Nigeria. Section 5

ln ordinary parlance,

'distress' connotes being in

danger or difficulty and in
need of help. According to
Smith and Wall (1992) it is a
state of inability' or'weakness'
which prevents the achievement

of set goals and aspirations,.
Bentson, (1986) associates

distress with a cessation of

independent operations or
continuance only by vifiue of
financial assistance from the
banking system's safety net
such as the supervisory/
regulatory agency or a deposit

insurer. Ologun, (1994)
describes a financial institution

as unhealthy if it exhibits
severe financial, operational
and managerial weaknesses.
CBN/NDIC (1 995) describes a
distressed financial institr.rtion as

"one with severe financial,
operational and managerial
weaknesses which have
rendered it difficult for the
institution to meet its obligations
to its customers, owners and

the economy as and when
due". Without necessarily
implying the degree or nature
of the problem, a bank is said
to be distressed when it is

either illiquid and/or insolvent
- Dr. J. G. Donli is the Director
of Research Dept. Nigeria Deposit lnsurance corporation. Being text of a paper delivered
at the Fifth seminar
for Finance Correspondents and Business Edrtors. held at lmo Concorde Hotel, Owerri,
lmo State from 26,h-2gk January, 2004.

64

Vol.2B No.

January/March,2004

1

to the extent that its ability to
discharge its obligations as at
when due is impaired. ln more
precise terms, illiquidity is a

state of inability to meet
payments obligations to
customers as at when due,

distress. CBN (2002)

provides 22

a working def inition of

were set using

assets' value i.e. negative

indicators of deterioration in

networth.

the aggregate performance of
banks. Specif
a
systemic distress would be

The above description
relates to an individual banking
firm. However, when a sizeable
proportion of the banks in the

system are experiencing this

NDIC, (1995) describes

deposits are threatened;
and

banking system distress as

"a situation in which a
sizeable proportion of

a

sharp reduction in the

value of financial institutions'
assets, resulting in apparent or
real insolvency of many

fi

nancial

institutions accompanied by
some runs and possibly the
collapse of some institutions".

Thesignificanceof the
useof hresholds istwofold. One
is hat it proMdes transparent and

banking system. Second,
because these criteria conform

frequenttopmanagement

rapid staff turnover;

f.

asandwhendue;
use of political influence;

g. petitions/anonymous
h. persistent adverse

i.
j.
k.

clearing position;

borrowing at desperate
rates;

persistentcontraventionof
laid down rules;and

persistent overdrawn
current account position
at the CBN.

3.0

CAUS$OFBANKDISTRESS
The broad causes of

bank distress particularly in
Nigeria include, but are not
limited, to the following:
31

Policy and Regulatory
Environment

with the global standard on

more

Prior to the adoption
of comprehensive economic
reform programme under the

comparable across time and
countries. Given the above

Programme (SAP), the

banking system superuision,

incidence and impacts of

distress become

Structural

Adjustment

conceptual description of

Nigerian banking system

distress for individual bank as

could simply be described as

system, we now examine the

aggregation amounts to the
causes of distress for the
banking system. These causes
are grcuped into mbroeconornic,

institutions, it is regarded as

rnacroe@nornic om irsthlimal
factors. Eichengreen and
Areta (2000) noted the

otherwise, it is systemic

prevailing limited understianding
of which of these 2 factors set

a generalised distress

d.

changes;

understanding and assessment

causes of bank distress which
of course are in reference to
individual banks but which in

incidence of distress, though

falsification of returns;

e. inability to meet obligations

of any noticeable crisis in the

depending on whether public
confidence in the system has
been eroded or not, financial
system distress is classified
into two namely, generalised

widespread among the

b.

c.

objective criteria for public

Furthermore,

public
not
been
has
confidence
the
affected
by
adversely

late submission of returns
to the regulatory authorities;

total loans and advances
are not performing.

wel*'as for the banking

or systemic. lf

Ogunleye

letters;

system, the banking system
is said to be distressed. CBN/

is

a.

said to have occurred when
at least two of the following
situations arise:

industry's total assets;

Bank of San Francisco (1985)
describes distressed f inancial
system as one in which "there

by

(1993); include the following:

ically,

their obligations threatens the
stability of the entire banking

other portfolio shifts and
eventual collapse of some
financial firms". ln a similar
tone, the Federal Reserve

indicated

some

critically distressed
control 20"/" of lhe

market value of their assets
which may lead to runs and

nature but the most common

and observable ones, as

shaken public confidence." To
operationalise this, thresholds

phenomenon to the extent
that their inability to honour

financial institutions have
liabilities exceeding the

The symptoms of
bank distress are varied in

systemic bank distress as
"those situations where the
solvency and/or liquidity of
many or most banks have
suffered shocks that have

while insolvency is a situation
in which the value of the firm's
liabilities is in excess of its

Symptoms of Distress

the

for ban

65

crises

highly regulated. Some
of these regulations had
sometimes been counterproductive and had mntributed

to the strains in our banking
system. Banks were subjected

to substantial restrictions on
their products and activities.
These restrictions had, to a
reasonable extent, limited
some banks' ability to adapt
to changing market conditions.
The government had generally in
the past made the control over

banks an important tool of
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the country's economic

share capital is N2 billion for

prompted the introduction of

some measures which

a new bank to be licensed and

belief that without such

adversely affected some to
them. Among such policies

interuention, the bank system

are the Prudential Guidelines,

might not cooperate in the

Statement of Accounting
Standards, the sudden
withdrawal of public sector

the existing universal banks
have the deadline of 31"1
December, 2OO2lo beef up
their paid-up equity share
capital to N1 billion. This

development strategies. These
policies were put in place in the

development effod because of
diveqence between public and

private goals. Some of the
policies manifested in the
form of direct controland the

problem of inadequate capital
has been further accentuated

deposits to CBN in 1989, and

the use of stabilisation

by the huge amount of nonperforming loans which has
eroded some banks' capital

securities by the CBN to mop

up excess liquidity in the

establishment of interest rate
ceiling as well as restrictions

base.

system.

The adoption of

on entry into the banking

lt

has even been

discovered that many of the

closed banks in Nigeria

industry.

these measures, though

Through the direct
credit controls, banks were

sometimes imperative,

started with fictitious capital

exposed many weak banks
and threatened them with

through the use of commercial
papers (Cps). Such Cps were

made to perform development
roles for which some of them

illiquidity and insolvency.

paid back soon

were illequipped. Consequenty,

Some banks which had earlier

their participation led them to

posted huge profits while
under providing for loan

commencement of business
with deposits. Many of such

serious financial problems
arising especially, f rom
mismatching of assets and
liabilities. The direct credit
controls often included the
requirement that banks
should provide subsidized
credit to priority sectors and

securities to mop up excess
liquidity also pushed some
marginal banks to illiquidity. ln

extreme cases of illiquidity,
there was near-panic as some

instances of default in the
repayment of loans and
advances to agriculture and
small and medium scale
enterprises even when they

banks were unable to meet
depositors' demand. Loss of
depositors' confi dence increase
flight to safety and aggravated

runs on some banks.

were given at below

Consequently, the adversely

market rates. Compulsory
participation of banks in the

affected banks resulted to

Rural Banking Programme in
the past had alsoforced some

he

distress bonowing particulady in

dubbed as "loss centres."
The controlof interest
rates in the past tended to
reduce banks' profitability and

contributed to the poor

financialcondition of some of

them. An effect of these
regulatory policies was the
large number of weak banks,

particularly, among the first
generation distressed banks.
Also, the need to sanitise the

operations of banks, in a
deregulated environment

exobitant

interest rates.

3.2

Capital lnadequacy

addition to the non-viability of

some of such branches
which some banks have

intefu ank market at

A function of capital

in a bank is to serve as a
means by which losses can
be absolved. Capital provides

a

cushion

to

withstand

owners

contributed nothing to own a
bank, yet they use the means
to amass wealth and ruin the
bank at the end of the day.

The use of stabilisation

public enterprises. There were

banks to expand faster than
their capabilities. That was in

so called bank

losses, started to post heavy
losses resulting in insolvency.

after

3.3

Economic Downturn
Theacfuerseeconornb

condition in Nigeria since mid1981 had been cfiaracterised by

high inflation, depreciating
value of the Naira, large fiscal

deficits, heavy external and
internal debt overhang and
slow growth. Arising from this

stress in the economy, many

borrowers, both corporate
bodies and individuals as well

as governments at all levels
were unable to service their
loans thereby making many
banks to come under severe

crisis. The macroeconomic
reforms introduced in 1986
also had its toll on the
external value of the Naira

abnormal losses not covered
by current earnings, enabling
banks to regain equilibrium
andto re-establish a normal
earnings pattern. The need for

depreciation that followed

adequate capital largely

domestic capacity under

informed the decision of the

Regulatory Authorities to
raise the minimum equity
share capital of banks over
the years. At present the
minimum paid-up equity
66

which was then believed to be

overvalued. A massive
shot up foreign manufacturing
input prices leading to greater
utilisation and reduced ability

of business borrowers to
repay their loans and
advances.
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Borrowing and Lending

Culture

This problem

of

economic downtum has been
exacerbated by the attitude of

some borrowers who are
unwilling to repay even when

they are known to have the
means to service their debts.
Such borrowers seek refuge
under the inadequate legal
framework and cumbersome

banks by granting loans and

loans were diverted for

advances without adequate
collaterals. Sometimes, the

personal use and for projects
different from which they were

loan applications were poorly

extended. Also, some

appraised with inadequate

borrowers have been known

documentation. Poor lending
and borrowing culture was
contributory to distress in the

to contract loans with the

system.

become bad from the moment
of extension.

TABLE

loan recovery processes wh ich
make it difficult for the lending

bank to foreclose collaterals.
Obtaining judgement when a
loan defaulter is sued is often

lengthy, thereby increasing
the cost of doing banking
business in Nigeria. Yet

justice delayed is justice
denied. ln the case of some

intention of not repaying from

the outset. Such loans had

1

ASSET QUALITY OF BANKS
N

Loans & Advances

Year

lndustry

on-Perfo

rm

Proportion of NonPerforming Loans to

ing

Loans & Advances

(++'billion)

(++'b

Distressed

il

lndustry

I

io n

Total Loans & Advances (7.)

)

Distressed

lndustry

Distressed

1

989

23.1

4.3

9.4

2.9

40.8

67.1

1

990

27

1'1.9

4.9

44 .-l

72.4

1

991

6.4
5.4

3S

992

41.4

12.8
'1
8.8

4.1

1

6.8

45.5

1

993
994

8

14 .7

41

58

1

43

1

29.s
29.5

64.6
68.9

1

t5./

253

0.4

7

6.5
43

4

9S5

109
'175.9

5.6
4 8.9

32.9
46.9
5 7.8

996

213.6

51 .7

7

2.4

3

3.9

33.9

1

290.4

4

9.6

7

enterprises, they wilfully

997

4.9

40.7

25.81

81 .92

't

6

37 0.2

29.1

3.3
24.8

1A .7

1

998
999

24.2

defaulted on the wrong notion

21

1 9.3
25.6

77.3
72.2

2000

519

26.4

1'l 1.6

20

21 .5

7

5.8

2001

803

123.1

135.7

35.4

'16.s

2

8.S

small borrowers particularly in
priority sectors of agriculture
and smalland medium scale

that the bank loans are part
of their share of the "national

cake." There are also

"professional" borrowers who
through connivance with some

32.9

7

5.5

Source: NDIC Annual Feport (various years)

3.5

Asymmetric

lnformation

banks' staff take bank loans
with no intention to repay

Closely related to

such loans. These problems

negative borrowing culture is

greatly impaired the quality of

3.6

Poor Corporab Gorcrnrnenu

Management

It has become a

asymmetric information which

worldwide dictum that the

banks' assets as nonperforming loans and

has been known to cause

quality of corporate governance

advances become unbearable

emerging rnarkets. Asym metric
information is described as a
situation whereby a borrower
taking out a loan has superior
information about the potential

and turn out to be a high
burden on manyof them (see
Table 1)

lnsider abuse by
bank owners, directors and
management statf is another
factor which exacerlcated loan
defaults in some weak banks.

banking crisis, particularly in

returns and risk associated
with the investment project
than the bank lending the

or management makes an
important difference between

sound and unsound banks.
The US Comptroller of the
Currency ascribed over 90% of
bank failures since deregulation
in the US as being due to poor
management. Just as it is in
otherpartsof theworld so it is

lnsiders in those banks

problem

asymmetric

established in Nigeria that
mismanagement is the main

obtained loans and advances

information is often rampant in

culprit causing banking crisis.

an unstable economy as

A very signifrcant

without collaterals

in
contravefltion of banking
regulations. State Government
banks were no exception.The
banks were used as extension

of the owning states'

treasuries. Management siaff
in the weak banks have also
been found to collude

custo mers to detraud

money (Mishkin, 1996). This

of

loans are likelyto be extended

for risky

projects and

bonowerc may have incentives
to misallocate bonowed funds
lor personal use or invest them

in unprofitable projects. With

the benefit of hindsight, it is
clear that many NERFUND,
NEXIM ard many agricultural

clwacteristic

of mismangement is in the
negative atft r& ard behaviour
of bank managers which is
dlfficult to reverse by the
application of ertemal poticies
and measures.

Thetrrcorrrmtypes
ol mismanagetnent, namely:
technical mismanagement,

Vol.28 No.

January/March,2OO4

1

cosmetic mismanagement,

cetera, particularly before the

where bankers see hemselves

desperate management and
fraud are identified to be

introduction of prudential

in danger to declare, among

guidelines. A typical example

fictitious BA to manage nonperforming loans at monthend in an attempt to hide the
bad status of the loans from
Examiners just recently. The

others, capital reduction,
operational loss, and no
dividends. The main
unwholesome practices in
desperate management by
Nigerian bankers include
speculation particularly by
the distressed banks which

bank in question credited a
loan account related to the

used to pay above the market
interest rates for deposits and

ex-Chairman with N500

charging higher interest to
borrowers. A bank that was

common in banks (World

of cosmetic mismanagement
happened in a bank as it used

Bank, 1989), are prominent in

our banking industry and

they often undermine
the health of our banks.

! .,.

Tech

n

i

cal mismanagement

involving inadequate policies,

lack of standard practices,
prevalence of over-extension,
poor lending, mismatching of

assets and liabilities, weak

million on the 28th May for an
alieged BA discounted only to
be reversed and debited with
the same N500 million on 7th
June of the foliowing month.
The cutoff date of examination
was 31"t May of that year. The

and ineffective intemal control

systems, and poor and lack

of strategic planning have
been prevalent in the Nigeria
banking industry. This often
leads to insider abuse as
depicted in Table 2.

known to be illiquid continued
to rollover interbanktakings at

50% to 52% interest rates.
Meanwhile, it was grossly
undercapitalised as over 76%

of its loans was

same bank employed "SWAP"

TABLE

Fraud is part of the
2

delinquent features that turn

Extent ot lnsider Loans in Selected Banks in Liquidation
as at the Date ot Closure
S/N

Closed Bank

not

performing.

Ratio of lnsider Loans to

Total Loans

(o/o )

good bank managers into bad

ones. When there are too
many of them, the affected
bank might have lost its

Ratio of Non-Perlorming
Loans to Total Loans

(o/"'l

1

Financial Merchant Bank

66.9

99.5

2

Kaoital Merchant Bank

50.0

96.2

capital severaltimes before it
knows. The management and

Alpha Merchant Bank

55.0

90.0

statf of many banks extend

Unilsd Commercial Bank

81.0

90.0

loans under suspicious

5

Republic Bank

64.9

98.0

circumstances and wanton

5

Com mercial Trust Bank

55.9

100.0

vftrlatirns of treir credit polides,

7

Com merce Bank

52.0

8

I

Credite Bank

76.0

I8.3
100.0

4

thus making it extremely

6.9

9

Prime Merchant Bank

80.7

10

Grouo Merchant Bank

77.6

94.5

11

Nigeria Merchant Bank

99.9

95.9

12

Royal Merchant Bank

69.0

98.0

dfficult or impossible to recover
all or a substantial part of such
loans. No doubt, the situation
described here is reminiscent
of what obtained in our banking
system which has been riddled

Source: NOIC Annual Report (various years)

Cosmetic
mismanagement (usually

to manage its liquidity. lt

a derivative of technical

looking, hoping and waiting for

purportedly placed N1 billion
in a discount house al3O"/"
for 12 days on 24th May and
the discount house placed the
same amount the same day

miracles to happen. This

with the bank at 32.5% for

depicts the typical practice of

same tenure. The bank
showed the N1 billion as
placement in the balance

mismanagement) consists of
hiding past and current losses

to buy time and stay afloat,

some bank managers in
Nigeria which include

systematic roll-over of
matured fixed deposits,
under-capitalisation, accruing
interest income on delinquent

facilities, keeping dividends
constant on spurious eamings,

fictitious collateralisations, et

with some fraudulent staff as
some closed banks became
distressed as a resultof fraud.

or "back-to-back" transaction

the

sheet but failed to show the
corresponding N1 billion taken
as liability, thereby using that

ploy to boost its liquidity as
at 31"rMay of that year.

Desperate

management is a condition
68

The amount involved/lost
through fraud and staff
disciplined as a result are
given in Table 3.
3.7

Aftermath of Competition
The deregulation of

the economy has brought
about increased competition
and innovation in the market

place. The

increasing

competition and innovation
have equally brought about
visible traces of strains into

the banking system. ln

a
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investment. ln this section,

TABLE 3

the common

resolution
options are first examined

EXTENT OF FRAUDS ANO FORGERIES IN BANKS
Year

Amount lnvolved

Actual/Expect6d LoBa

No. ot Stalt Tormlnated/Retlred/

15_3

313

19qO

while the measures adopted
in Nigeria are highlighted in
the last part of the section.

417
267

19S2

411 a

19C3

141C

1

950.7

737

31C5 s

2000

2451_1

692

493

2001

N50,000.00. The procedure
insider abuse are precarious

for pay-off includes the

cankenruorms causing distress

verification of accounts and

in some of them. ln fact,

balances, crediting interest up

inefficient and marginal f irms
be crowded out and allowed
to go under. ln accordance
with the principle of market
economy, there is free entry
and there should be free exit.

boardroom has changed to
bedroom in some banks to

to the day of closing and

meddlesome interference of
some privately owned banks.
Besides, most of the

creditors would only have

Some banks that have

govemment owned banks are

often treated as political

part of the proceeds of

previously been protected f rom

competition do not have the

banks. Some of these banks
are c.haracterised by inept

management expertise to
survive in an increasingly

heighten the extent of

printing cheques for payment,
etc. Uninsured depositors and
claim on the receiverfrom the

proceeds ol liquidation. Also,
liquidation would be used to
defray the deposit insurance

institution's expenses

management whose tenures of

connected with administering

complex, volalile and cornpetitive

office are occasionally very

the liquidation process.

market which has resufted from
banking deregulation. ln away,
therefore, it is a paradox that

unstable. ln most cases as the

owner government change

while competition enhanced
the menu of bank products
available to customers, such

banks. One result

It should be noted
that the cost of pay-off will
include other costs that
cannot be easily estimated.

competition has indirectly
caused the insolvency and
failure of some banks in
Nigeria through increased
cost schedules (K.S.
Adeyemi,1993)

3.8

Pay-Off

Section 26 of NDIC Decree is

Source: NDIC Anual Report (various years)

competitive environment
allocative and operational
eff iciency require that

a

payment of insured deposits
up to the insurable limit to the
depositors of the liquidated
bank. ln the case of Nigeria,
the limit as provided for under

3

1 oao 60

Common Resol ntion Options

This involves the

1011 4

1qq7
1gSa
1999

4.1

OtrolershipSructurc/Folfical
lnterference

Ownershipstructure 4.0
is one of the major variables
that could be used to explain
financial distress in Nigerian

frequentlyso also do board and
key management staff of the

is

One of such costs is

inconsistent policies due to the
fact that what one board did,
the succeeding one (forpolitical
reasons) would overturn with

administrative costs, for

reckless abandon. Even

people recruited for the pay-

example, staff salaries of the

receiving agent and other
personnel emoluments of

though the numberof banks in

off exercise which may run into

this category has reduced
considerably, the remaining

several months. Operational

ones still exhibit the situation
described here.
THE RESOLUTION

OPTIONS

The

applicable
to

banks. Owner's direct

options are either

intervention, most especially in
government controlled banks,
in the internaloperation ol the

or liquidation. ln the case of
the latter, shareholders are

bank has contributed to

made to lose their investment

restructure a bank for viability

distress in some of them. ln

while the adoption of the

private banks, the prevalence
of boardroom quarrels and

shareholders losing their

former may or may not entail

69

costs involve hiring debt
collectors, liquidators,
lawyers, estate agents,
security agents, et cetera. ln
addition, there is the cost of
publicity and enlightenment
campaigns that should be
mounted.
One majoradvantage
of the pay-off option is that it

is most likely to instil market

discipline in the banking
system. lt will provide the
warning signalto other banks
that the era ol propping-uP
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insolvent banks is over. Thus,

shareholders, Board of
Directors, Management,
Creditors and Depositors of
banks will see the need to

same locality. The acquiring

bank will be given enough

c.

Bridge Bank

This is a situation
whereby a failed bank is
turned over to a new bank

ensure that risk-taking by
their banks is minimised. ln

to cover the insured deposits

transferred from the failed

specifically set up to assume
the assets and liabilities of the
failed bank with little or no

a situation where frauds and

bank. Like in the pay-off, only

compensation

forgeries are rampant and

insured deposits are fully

where adequate records are
not kept, the receiver would
have to make a reasonable

covered. The deposit insurance

cash and/or risk less assets

estimate of its ultimate

institution takes over the
assets of the failed bank
which it then markets or

to

manages. The acquiring bank

a

allthe bad assets of the failed

f

inancial obligation

may also purchase some or

depositors.

There might be

bank.

operates, particularly, in the

transfer option would ensure
continuity of banking services
and would be less disruptive
to the economy than the payoff. lt would promote market

of banking to effect the pay-

off. This will negate the
government policy of
encouraging banking habit
among the citizenry as the
exercise may lead to loss of

public conf idence in the
banking system. Pay-off also
takes a lot of valuable time as

the exercise may run into
months, if not years. The
problem of inadequate

records might

make

verification of depositors'
accounts and claims more
tedious. The problem of debt
recovery which may give rise

to litigation would be

worsened. The loss of
uninsured deposits which
could be substantial could
cause socio-economic
problems.

I want to note and
emphasize here that the likely
adverse effects of the pay-off

option particularly on public
confidence has always made
it the last option. The deposit

insurance institution would
therefore have tried other
options to no avail before
considering the pay-off
approach.

lnsured Deposits Transfer

This involves the
transfer of insured deposits of

to the
shareholders of the failed
bank. The bridge bankcan be
established and managed by
the insuring body for about 2

to 3 years. The bridge bank
would operate immediately
after the demise of the failed
bank, preferably, in the same
premises and would retain the

denial of banking services in
the area where the failed bank
rural communities. Also, there
will be temporary suspension

b.

the failed bank to another
bank preferably within the

lnsured deposits

discipline like inthecase of pay-

off. This arrangement would
require less manpower needs
compared wih fe paydf option.
The Nigerian banking system

has some banks with large

branch network which can
easily accept the transferred
deposits. The establishment
and spread of community
banks across the country
could make this option
feasible without the loss of
continuity of banks services.
The immediate direct

financial burden on the
insuring institution would be
enormous. The problem of
verifying the exact amount of

failed bank's licence but a
different name. The bridge
bank would permit continuity

of banking services to

all

customers and fully protect
its depositors and creditors of
the failed bank. ln establishing

a bridge bank to take over a
failed bank, the receiverwould

have to provide a Board

of Directors and new
management that will re-build,
refloat and manage the bank

into a viable and saleable
bank. The bridge bankwillbe

expected to meet all the
obligations and commitments
of the failed bank.
A bridge bank is less
disruptive to banking services
than pay-off. There would be
no mass retrenchment of staff
and this will reduce the social

costs of liquidation through
pay-off. Operating a bridge

deposits to be transferred due

bank would

to inaccurate records might
be encountered. This may

continuous banking services

take valuable time

provide

to customers, engender

of them willfallon the receiver.

confidence in the banking
system and ensure stability
in the money stock. lt is
an organised method of
disposing of a failed bank
without selling the assets of

This may also take time and

the failed bank underdistress.

require technical staff

It would not precipitate any
crisis in the system.

and

personnel. ln the event of the
acquiring bank not being able
to purchase some of the risk
assets, the burden of disposing

The

.

uninsured

deposits in the books of the
failed bank may be lost if the
proceeds from liquidation of

assets are not sufficient to
pay these depositors.
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There may be

uncertainty about the viability,
prof itability and marketabitity

of the new venture given the
institutional constraints of the

I
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failed bank such

as

TheP&Aan"angement

clientele, staff culture, public
perception, et cetera. ln the

is fraught with uncertainty due

to the possible long and

Iail

unfortunate event of the bridge

protracted negotiations. The

bank not being viable, the
deposit insurance institution
would still be faced with the
option of pay-off had been
adopted initially. Floating a

financial burden of this option

A bank with a strong

may be difficult to estimate.

deposit base and loyal

It might be difficult to find an

customers that are

bridge bankwould not ensure
and enforce market discipline

ready to sink and swim

merge with the failed bank
due to the concern that the

with the failed bank

creditors would be protected.

PurchaseandAssumption

acquisition might have
negative eff ect on the

(P&A)

capitalization or earnings or

and

This is a merger-type

transaction which involves
purchasing the assets of a
failed bank and assuming of

its liabilities by another
insured bank. ln this case,
the receiver would have to

asset-liability mix of the
acquiring bank. Also, the
branching structure of the

merger partners. lt might be
plausible to consider splitting
the failed bank into separate

bank to continue to operate

Splitting it will be attractive to
banks that wish to enhance

failed bank would not
likely have a huge run on

it as its customers

would not believe that it
could die.

[iii]

Banking Culture
lf the restructuring of

a failed bank through
other options earlier
discussed would lead to

lowering of banking
Open BankAssistance

where the failed bank has
multi-branch network.

would be a candidate for
this option. Such a

failed bank and the acquiring
bank(s) might not be
compatible for easy merging.

negotiate with potential e.

parts with the intent of
merging the parts to more
than one bank especially

Goodwill

efficient bank that would
stigma surrounding the failed
bank might attach itself to the
acquiring bank and that the

as all depositors

d.

big to fail" doctrine being
applied in the Philippines.

habit, then the option ol

Allowing a failed

open bank assistance is
considered apt and most

desirable. A deposit
insurance scheme is

in the same name as a going

concern is called open bank
assistance. lt would involve
change in ownership and
management of the bank;

designed to promote and

sustain healthy and
growing banking culture

injection of fresh funds in the
form of equity and/or loan

particulady in a developing

country like Nigeria. The

resolution of a failed

assets,

capital; and reorganization
and overhauling of the bank
including rationalisation oI
stalf and branches. ln the
United States where this
option is common, some

liabilities and eamings. lt might

factors are considered before

any negative attitude of the

also present to the receiver

its choice. Some of these

more complicated negotiation
problems because ol dealing
with multiple merger partners
as opposed tojust one.

factors are:

banking community
towards the insurance

market penetration or establish
new branch locations. However,
itwould involve balancing each

branch books with a view to

determining

its

P&Awouldensure
that all depositors are
protected thereby giving
credibility to deposit insurance

scheme. lt would ensure
continuity in rendering of bank
services thereby engendering

confidence in the banking
system and also .helps to
promote market discipline as
creditors of the Iailed bank
might not be paid. lt would be

less disruptive to
economy than pay-off

.

the

bank through this option
would definitely make the
public to have confidence

in the deposit insurance
scheme and ameliorate

scheme.

lll

EssentialDoctrine
lf a bank is very big
and with a large spread
of its network of
branches, then such a
bank is considered
essential as ils retention

would sustain public
confidence in the banking
and financial system. This

is particularly so for
communities where the
lailed bank is the only
one rendering banking
services. This is similar

to the principle of 'too
71

Iiv]

CostConsideration

is

Open bankassistance

considered less

expensive and more
manageable than most
other options. This basic
advantiage is limited to a
successful restructuring
through this option but the
aftermah of tre failed bank
not becoming viable after

open bank assistance
could lead to a colossal
loss of funds.
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Failure Resoltrtion Measurcs

owed to failed banks and

Adopted in Nigeria

to punish individuals

also been paid to some general
creditors of some of the banks.

the

For example, the general

monumental incidence

creditors of Pan African Bank

of financial malpractices

(in-liquidation) had been paid a
total of about N167.25 million.
The amount represented about

involved in

Depending on the
severity and peculiarity of the

situation, the Regulatory
Authorities in Nigeria have

in the distressed banks.

over the years, successfully

The infiative was indeed a
complimentiary measu re.

measures, among others, to
address bank distress:-

The highlyacclaimed

adopted the following

i.

about N254.00 million declared

Accommodation

the Regulatory

Authorities was indeed

Likewise, Amicable bank
declared 100% dividend to its

system. Following the
implementation of the
Decree, a reasonable
amount of recoveries

Preferred Creditors and 10% to

other creditors. Furthermore,

the shareholders of Nigeria
Merchant Bank (in-liquidation)

had been made.

had received liquidation

by the

(24) distressed banks
Regulatory

As part of failure
resolution measures, the

Authorities to safeguard

Nigeria Deposit lnsurance

their assets.

Corporation (NDIC) continues

Acquisition,

to serve as the liquidator to

34 closed banks.

restructuring and sale of

dividend of N550 million.

The combined effect of

these measures was

a
significant reduction in the level
of distress in the banking system
as well as enhancement of the
public confidence in the system.

The

Corporation's activities in this

seven (7) distressed

regard include the

banks to new investors.
a

distressed banks that
failed to respond to
various regulatory/
supervisory initiatives.
While the liquidation of
Savannah Bank of Nigeria
and PeakMerchantBank

were suspended due to

is

noteworthy that all the
banks were closed with
minimal disruption to the

banking system.
V

the end of June, 2003.

Nigerian banking

Takeoverofmanagement
and control of twenty-four

Court action, it

N"|39.77 million out of about
N168.1 million declared as at

distress and promote
the soundness of the

year.

Closure of 36 terminally

had been paid the sum ol

a major plank in the
resolve to contain

commercialand merchant
banks and the transfer of
same to CBN during that

tv.

end of March, 2003. Similarly,
the general creditors of Rims
Merchant Bank (in-liquidation)

which was facilitated by

1989 f ollowing the
withdrawal of public
sector funds from

ilt

as liquidation dividend to the
creditors of the bank as at the

implementation of the
Failed Banks Decree

facilities were granted to
ten (10) bankswhich had
serious liquidity crises to
the tune of N2.3 billion in

il

67"/" of the total amount of

The promulgation and
implementation of the

following:

Payment Of Liquidation
Dividend to Depositors

5.0

SUMMARYAND
CONCLUSION

ln this paper, an attempt

ln addition to the payment

has been made to examine the

of insured depositors of the

causes of bank distress and

closed banks, depositors with

resolution option. The case of

credit balances in excess of the

the Nigerian experience has

insured limit were paid

liquidation dividends based on
the volume of proceeds of the
closed banks' assets realised
by the Corporation. As at June
30, 2003, the Corporation had
declared an aggregate dividend
of N8,796.85 million for 32 out

of 34 banks in liquidation. Of
the 32 banks, 9 banks had
declared a final dividend of 100

been the focus of the paper. lt
has been observed in the paper

that while the general causes
of bank distress appear to be
uniform the contribution of each

factor varies from country to

country. Accordingly, it
becomes imperative that
resolution options to be applied

should be dictated by the
nature of the problem and the

Debts) and Financial

percent of total deposits
indicating that all their

peculiarities of the affected
banking system. ln the main,

Malpractices Decree No.
18 of 1 994 was to ensure

depositors had fully recovered
their deposits.

the way fonrvard in achieving a
stable banking system is for all
parties concerned to contribute

Failed Banks (Recovery of

speedy dispensation of

of

justice.Themainthrustof b.

Payment

the Decree was to assist
in the recovery of debts

Dividend to General Creditors
Liquidation dividend had

72

liquidation

to a

favourable banking

environment. ln that regard, the
operators should adhere stricily
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to the rules of the game, the
regulatory authorities should
enhance the supervisory

should put in place enabling
legal, macro-economic and
political frameworks.

capacity while the government
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